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Abstract
This paper compares di¤erent implementations of monetary policy in a new-
Keynesian setting. We can show that a shift from Ramsey optimal policy under
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able when policy targets (ination and output gap) are forward-looking variables
in the new-Keynesian theory.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The question of how to conduct monetary policy is one of the most discussed questions
in macroeconomic theory. In this paper, we will compare Ramsey optimal policy which
is based on a negative feedback mechanism to a Taylor rule which is based on a positive
feedback mechanism. Both settings are analyzed in the same New-Keynesian benchmark
model with households intertemporal optimization of consumption and a New-Keynesian
Phillips curve.
On the one hand, negative feedback is the core mechanism for stabilizing dynamic
systems with optimal control (Aström and Kumar (2014), Chatelain and Ralf (2019b)).
On the other hand, determinacy, as required by rational expectations theory, is often as-
sociated with a positive feedback mechanism in the New-Keynesian setting. Barnett and
Chen (2015) and Barnett and Duzhak (2008, 2010), therefore, emphasize the importance
of bifurcations in the reference New-Keynesian macroeconomic model (Gali (2015)). The
Taylor rule parameters (the response of the interest rate to ination or to the output
gap) are bifurcation parameters. A small change of their values may lead to big changes
of the dynamic path, from stability to instability and conversely.
The aim of this paper is to clarify these issues further, extending the bifurcation
results of Barnett and Duzhak (2008 and 2010) on the closed economy New-Keynesian
model. We use Wonhams (1967) pole placement theorem to locate linear feedback rule
parameters for two basic types of policy: New-Keynesian Taylor rule and Ramsey optimal
policy.
For Ramsey optimal policy under quasi-commitment, the policy targets (ination and
output gap) are forward-looking. Optimal behavior implies that the policy instruments
(the interest rate and its lag) are optimally predetermined, using initial transversality
conditions. This leads to negative feedback Taylor rule parameters since higher ination
would lead the Fed to set interest rates in a way that produces lower future ination.
This mechanism is in the spirit of Keynesian stabilization theory.
The private sector agents have a unique optimal anchor of forward-looking output gap
and ination on the unique optimal initial values of the observable central bank funds
rate and its lag. With Ramsey optimal policy, negative feedback Taylor rule parameters
are compatible with determinacy, which corresponds to the uniqueness of the path of
forward-looking variables.
In the New-Keynesian model, the only equation which is not derived from optimal
intertemporal rational choice is the Taylor rule. Hence, it is the only equation where the
researcher writing down the model can arbitrarily decide if the variable whose behavior
is governed by the Taylor rule equation, the central banks funds rate, is predetermined
or forward-looking. This ad hoc theoretical assumption is an input in order to apply
Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition. If the central banks funds rate
is assumed to be forward-looking for forward-looking ination and output gap, positive
feedback Taylor rule parameters lead to determinacy, with only one possible value of
ination suiTable for the central bank. As Cochrane (2011) states: In New-Keynesian
models, higher ination leads the Fed to set interest rates in a way that produces even
higher future ination. For only one value of ination today will ination fail to explode."
Ination and output gap are forward-looking variables that need to be anchored on
predetermined variables. If the central banks funds rate is a forward-looking variable,
it cannot be an anchor. Hence, the private sector agents are assumed to anchor ina-
tion and output gap on non-observable variables, which are two ad hoc autoregressive
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predetermined shocks: a cost-push shock and a productivity shock.
We can show that the shift from Ramsey optimal policy, with two stable eigenvalues,
to a Taylor rule, with two unstable complex conjugate eigenvalues, corresponds to a Hopf
bifurcation which is only driven by the choice of a theoretical assumption by researchers
on central banks funds rate as being optimally predetermined variables (Ramsey optimal
policy) or ad hoc forward-looking variable (Taylor rule).
The ad hoc assumption that policy instrument should be forward-looking instead
of backward-looking when the policy targets are forward-looking is the origin of the
bifurcation of the dynamic systems when assuming New-Keynesian Taylor rule in place
of Ramsey optimal policy.
Hence, our policy recommendation would be to use Ramsey optimal policy with a
reduced form negative feedback Taylor rule. For the monetary transmission channel,
empirical work may conrm the relevance of a delayed cost-of-capital channel of monetary
policy where interest rate is negatively correlated with future output as opposed to an
intertemporal substitution channel where the interest rate is positively correlated with
future output gap. If this is the case, a negative feedback Taylor rule parameter of the
response of interest rate to output gap is positive. Else, it would be negative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the model and its dynamic
properties are presented, including Barnett and Duzhaks (2008, 2010) bifurcations fron-
tier. In Section 3, Ramsey optimal policy and a Taylor rule are compared. Section 4
shows that a shift from Ramsey optimal policy to a New-Keynesian Taylor rule corre-
sponds to a Hopf bifurcation. In Section 5, we analyze the consequences when changing
the assumptions on the exogenous shocks. Section 6 concludes.
2 BIFURCATIONS INTHENEW-KEYNESIANMODEL
2.1 The New-Keynesian Model
The New-Keynesian private sectors four-equations model is written with all variables
as log-deviations of an equilibrium (Gali (2015)). In the representative households in-
tertemporal substitution consumption Euler equation, the expected future output gap
Etxt+1 is positively correlated with the real rate of interest, equal to the nominal rate
it minus expected ination Ett+1. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES)
 = 1= is a measure of the responsiveness of the growth rate of consumption to the
interest rate, usually considered to be smaller than one. It is the inverse of , the relative
uctuation aversion or the relative degree of resistance to intertemporal substitution of
consumption, which measures the strength of the preference for smoothing consumption
over time, usually considered to be larger than one.
xt = Etxt+1    (it   Ett+1) + zt with  > 0: (1)
A non-controllable exogenous stationary and predetermined variable zt is autoregres-
sive of order one (0 < jz;xj < 1) where "z;t are zero-mean, normally, independently
and identically distributed additive disturbances. The initial value of the predetermined
forcing variable is given.
zt = zzt 1 + "z;t, z0 given. (2)
In the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, expected ination Ett+1 is negatively correlated
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with the current output gap xt with a sensitivity   < 0.
t = Ett+1 + xt + ut with 1 >  > 0 and  > 0:
Sign restrictions are such that parameters ; ;  are all strictly positive. A non-
controllable exogenous stationary and predetermined variable cost-push shock ut is au-
toregressive of order one ( 0 < juj < 1) where "u;t are zero-mean, normally, independently
and identically distributed additive disturbances. The initial value of the predetermined
cost-push shock u0 is given.
ut = uut 1 + "u;t , u0 given. (3)
Firstly, the controllable dynamics of the New-Keynesian model with its feedback Tay-
lor rule can be written as follows:

Etxt+1
Ett+1

=

1 + 

  

 

1


| {z }
=Ayy

xt
t

| {z }
=yt
+


0

| {z }
=By
it +
  1 

0   1


| {z }
=Ayz

zt
ut

:| {z }
=zt
The matrix notation in bold below corresponds to the notation of the augmented
linear quadratic regulator (LQR) in Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996,
p.203) and Hansen and Sargent (2007). The two policy targets, the output gap xt and
ination t, are two-time-step Kalman controllable by a single policy instrument, the
interest rate it and its rst lag it 1, if both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the slope of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve are di¤erent from zero:  6= 0 which
implies @Et(xt+1)
@it
6= 0 and  = @Et+1(t+2)
@xt+1
6= 0. This is found computing the rank of Kalman
controllability matrix:
rank (By;AyyBy) = rank


0

,

1 + 

  

 

1



0

= rank
 
 



 + 1

0  


!
= 2 if  6= 0 and  6= 0:
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is zero  = 0, the rank of the Kalman
controllability matrix is zero. Then, the output gap is not controllable by the interest
rate in the rst period. Even if the one-period ahead output gap can control two-period
ahead future ination ( 6= 0), as the current policy instrument (the interest rate) cannot
control the one-period ahead output gap, the interest rate cannot control the two-period
ahead ination.
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is di¤erent from zero  6= 0 and  = 0,
the rank of Kalman controllability matrix is one. The output gap is controllable by the
interest rate in the rst period. But the output gap next period cannot control two
periods ahead ination ( = 0), so that the current period interest rate cannot control
two periods ahead ination.
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is di¤erent from zero  6= 0 and the slope
of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is di¤erent from zero  6= 0, the rank of Kalman
controllability matrix is two. The rst period output gap is controllable by the interest
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rate. The rst-period ahead output gap controls two-period ahead ination. Hence,
there is a non-zero correlation between expected two-period ahead ination and current
interest, @Et+1(t+2)
@it
= @Et+1(t+2)
@Et(xt+1)
@Et(xt+1)
@it
6= 0. The fact that the interest rate does not
show up in the New-Keynesian Phillips curve implies that the e¤ect of the interest rate
has to go through a rst-period e¤ect on the output gap, so that a change on interest
rate only shows up in two-period ahead ination. The positive correlation of the interest
rate on the one-time step expected output gap ( > 0) on the rst period is followed on
the second-period negative correlation of the one-period ahead output gap on two-period
ahead expected ination (  > 0).
@Et+1 (t+2)
@it
=
@Et+1 (t+2)
@Et (xt+1)
<0
@Et (xt+1)
@it
>0
< 0:
Kalman (1960) controllability is the generalization of Tinbergens (1952) principle for
a static linear system of equations (n policy instruments can control n policy targets in
a single period) to linear dynamic systems. One policy instrument and its rst lag can
control two policy targets in two periods.
Secondly, the dynamics of the non-controllable exogenous forcing variables can be
stated as: 
zt+1
ut+1

=

z 0
0 u

| {z }
=Azz

zt
ut

+

"z;t
"u;t

:
Thirdly, the feedback linear policy rule in the augmented linear quadratic regulator
responds also to forcing variables (Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996,
p.203), Hansen and Sargent (2007)):
it =
 
Fx F
| {z }
=Fy

xt
t

+
 
Fz Fu
| {z }
=Fz

zt
ut

:
2.2 Dynamic Properties
The dynamic properties of the New-Keynesian model depend on the eigenvalues of the
system linearized around the steady state. In this section we show that a unique relation-
ship between the two Taylor rule parameters (F; Fx) and the trace and the determinant
of the closed-loop matrix exist. This will allow us to analyze determinacy and the ex-
istence of bifurcations by looking at the Taylor rule parameters that have an economic
interpretation which is sometimes missing for the trace and determinant of a dynamic sys-
tem. Additionally to Barnett and Duzhaks (2008) Hopf bifurcation border and Barnett
and Duzhaks (2010) ip bifurcation border, the last missing side of the stability triangle
which corresponds to the saddle-node bifurcation border can be identied. This specic
relation in the New-Keynesian model is a particular case of the mapping of feedback rule
parameters with closed-loop eigenvalues of controllable linear system demonstrated by
Wohnam (1967) pole placement theorem. We use Azariadis (1993, pp. 63-67) conditions
on the trace and determinant for a discrete dynamic system of dimension 2 in order to
nd the bifurcation limits of the stability triangle in the plane of Taylor rule parameters.
The closed-loop matrix Ayy+ByFy (denoted A+BF in what follows) of the control-
lable part of the New-Keynesian model is:
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
1 + 

  

 

1


+


0
 
Fx F

=

1 + 

+ Fx    + F
 

1


The characteristic polynomial of the closed-loop matrixA+BF of the New-Keynesian
model is a function of its trace T and determinant D leading to two eigenvalues 1 and
2:
p() = det (A+BF  I) = 2   T+D = (  1)(  2) = 0:
The eigenvalues (the roots of the characteristic polynomial) are non-linear functions
of the trace and the determinant. We either have two ordered real eigenvalues or two
complex conjugate eigenvalues:
1 =
T  pT 2   4D
2
< 2 =
T +
p
T 2   4D
2
if  = T 2   4D  0
1 =
T   ip4D   T 2
2
and 2 = 1 =
T + i
p
4D   T 2
2
if  = T 2   4D < 0:
The trace T and determinant D of the closed-loop matrixA+BF, however, are a¢ne
functions of the Taylor rule parameters Fx and F, where constants are, respectively, the
trace T (A) and the determinant D (A) of the open-loop matrix A:
T (A+BF) = 1 +
1

+


+ Fx = T (A) + Fx , (4)
D (A+BF) =
1

+


Fx +


F = D (A) +
1

Fx +


F; (5)
with T (A) = 1 +
1

+


and D (A) =
1

: (6)
Conversely, the Taylor rule parameters Fx and F are linear functions of the di¤erence
of the closed-loop and the open-loop trace T (A+BF)   T (A) and of the di¤erence of
the closed-loop and the open-loop determinant D (A+BF) D (A) and a¢ne functions
of the closed-loop trace and determinant:
Fx =
1

(T (A+BF)  T (A)) = 1

T (A+BF)  1


1 +
1

+



; (7)
F =   1

(T (A+BF)  T (A)) + 

(D (A+BF) D (A)) (8)
=   1

T (A+BF) +


D (A+BF) +
1

+
1

.
In classic control, these feedback rule parameters are corresponding to a pole place-
ment" with desired closed-loop eigenvalues dened by the parameters of the character-
istic polynomial, which are in dimension 2, the trace T (A+BF) and the determinant
D (A+BF). This relation can also be found using the canonical form of the dynamic
system or using Ackermanns (1972) formula (see appendix B).
In Azariadis (1993, chapter 8), a stability triangle with Hopf (D = 1 and  < 0),
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ip (p( 1) = 0) and saddle-node (p(1) = 0) bifurcation borders and a quadratic function
delimiting complex conjugate versus non-complex solutions (discriminant  = 0) are
described in the plane of the trace and determinant (T;D). This denes areas with
zero, one or two stable eigenvalues (1; 2) in the plane (T;D). We use Azariadis (1993)
insights to compute bifurcation borders in the plane of Taylor rule bifurcation parameters
(F; Fx). An example for given parameter values of the New-Keynesian model is depicted
in Figure 1 with the numerical values for the corresponding points and the values of
the rule parameters and the eigenvalues given in Table 1. Inside the triangle ABC the
eigenvalues have modulus smaller than 1, and outside the triangle at least one eigenvalue
is larger than one in absolute value. The dotted parabola through the points A, 
, and B
corresponds to a discriminant equal to zero with complex eigenvalues on the right-hand
side of the parabola and real eigenvalues on its left-hand side. The center 
 has both
eigenvalues equal to zero (1 = 2 = 0) and provides the Taylor rule parameters with the
fastest stabilization.
 = 0, 1

+


Fx +


F =
1
4

1 +
1

+


+ Fx
2
:
On the segment connecting the points A and B both eigenvalues are conjugate complex
and have modulus one. This is the case when the determinant is equal to one:
D(A+BF) = 1, Fx =    1

  F:
Above this line, that is for policy parameters Fx >
 1

  F, the eigenvalues have
modulus larger than one and below this line, that is for policy parameters Fx <
 1

 F,
the eigenvalues have modulus smaller than one. Crossing this line from inside the triangle
corresponds to a Hopf bifurcation, see also Barnett and Duzhak (2008).
To analyze the real eigenvalues, we look at the characteristic polynomial:
p(a) = (a  1) (a  2) > 0, a < 1 < 2 or 1 < 2 < a; (9)
p(a) = (a  1) (a  2) < 0, 1 < a < 2 . (10)
The two lines p (1) = 0 and p ( 1) = 0 divide the plane into four regions as shown in
Figures 1 and 2. They cross at point C (1 =  1 and 2 = 1).
On the line going through the points A and C, at least one of the real eigenvalues is
equal to one. It is characterized by
p (1) = 1  T (A+BF) +D(A+BF) = 0
, Fx = 
1   (1  F) or F = 1 

1  


Fx.
If Fx > 0 but not too large, F can be slightly below one. If Fx < 0, F is strictly
larger than one: it satises the Taylor principle. When the discount factor  is close to
one, the slope of the line is close to innity (vertical line), so that this condition is close
to the Taylor principle condition F > 1. It goes through the point A (1 = 2 = 1) of
Table 1 which is the point of intersection of the parabola of a discriminant equal to zero
( = 0) and a determinant equal to one D = 12 = 1. It goes through the point C
(1 =  1 and 2 = 1) of Table 1, point of intersection of the line p ( 1) = 0.
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On the right-hand side of the line p (1) = 0 and inside the triangle, both eigenvalues
are smaller than one in absolute value. Crossing the line from the left leads to one
eigenvalue larger than one and the other one smaller than one, a saddle-node bifurcation.
Similarly,
p ( 1) = 1 + T +D = 0) Fx =  2

  
1 + 
  
1 + 
F (11)
which goes through the points C (1 =  1 and 2 = 1) and B (1 = 2 =  1), see
Table 1. Above this line and inside the triangle, we have p ( 1) > 0, with both roots
smaller than 1 in absolute value. Below this line p ( 1) < 0, one of the eigenvalues is
smaller than  1 and the other eigenvalue is larger than  1. Crossing this line from inside
the triangle corresponds to a ip bifurcation, see also Barnett and Duzhak (2010).
The parameter values in Table 1 correspond to some estimated values:  = 0:5 for the
intertemporal elasticity in the USA (Havranek et al. (2015)) and  = 0:1 for the slope of
the New-Keynesian Phillips curve  = 0:1 (Mavroeidis et al. (2014)).
Table 1: Stability triangle with center and point of laissez-faire (origin) of
the New-Keynesian model ( = 0:5,  = 0:1, = 0:99), with T (A) = 1+ 1

+ 

= 2:
06 > 2.
1 2 1 + 2 12 F Fx
A 1 1 2 1
 (2 T (A))+(1  1 )

= 1:01 2 T (A)

=  0:12
B  1  1  2 1  ( 2 T (A))+(1 
1
 )

= 81:0  2 T (A)

=  8:12
C  1 1 0  1 T (A)+( 1 
1
 )

= 1:41  T (A)

=  4:12

 0 0 0 0
T (A)+(  1 )

= 21  T (A)

=  4:12
O 0 < 1 < 1 1 <
1
1
T (A) 1

0 T (A) T (A)

= 0
Figure 1 represents bifurcation lines delimiting the number of stable eigenvalues for
the New-Keynesian model for positive sign restrictions on monetary policy transmission
mechanism. The case of negative sign restrictions on monetary policy transmission mech-
anism is treated separately in section 2.4 (Figure 2). Figure 1 shows how the plane is
divided by the four reference lines p ( 1) = 0, p (1) = 0,  = 0 and D = 1 into eight
regions. We start in the upper left quadrant and move counter-clockwise.
Region 1: On the left of the line AC and above the line BC, p (1) < 0 and p( 1) > 0.
Both eigenvalues are on the same side of  1 and on di¤erent sides of 1. The only
possibility is  1 < 1 < 1 < 2. The steady state is a saddle-point. This area includes
the origin 0 which corresponds to the laissez-faire open-loop equilibrium, where both
Taylor rule parameters are equal to zero.
Region 2: On the left of the line AC and below the line BC, p (1) < 0 and p( 1) < 0.
The only possibility is 1 <  1 and 1 < 2. Both eigenvalues are on di¤erent sides of 1
and on di¤erent sides of  1. The steady state is a source.
Region 3: On the right of the line AC and below the line BC, p (1) > 0 and p( 1) < 0.
Both eigenvalues are on the same side of 1 and on di¤erent sides of  1. The only
possibility is 1 <  1 < 2 < 1. The steady state is a saddle-point.
Region 4: On the right of the line AC and above the line BC, p (1) > 0 and p( 1) > 0.
This region is split into ve regions as follows:
(4.1): Above the line BC and below the parabola: Both eigenvalues are real with
 1 < 1 < 2 < 1. The steady state is a sink.
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(4.2): Above the parabola and below the line AB: Both eigenvalues are conjugate
complex with modulus smaller than one j1j = j2j < 1, the steady state is a sink.
(4.3): Above the line AB and inside the parabola: Both eigenvalues are conjugate
complex with modulus larger than one j1j = j2j > 1, the steady state is a source.
(4.4): Outside the parabola and on the right of the line AC: Both eigenvalues are real
and larger than one with 1 < 1 < 2. The steady state is a source.
(4.5): The last region corresponds to the area outside the triangle above the line BC
below the parabola. Here, both eigenvalues are negative 1 < 2 <  1, with their sum
(trace) below  2.
In the stability triangle ABC, the Taylor principle is satised F > 1 and the output
gap Taylor rule parameter is negative: Fx < 0.
Crossing the lines p(1) = 0 or p( 1) = 0 outside the stability triangle corresponds to
another type of bifurcations between unstable dynamic systems in the sense that number
of stable eigenvalues shifts from one to zero or the reverse. In particular, for positive
Taylor rule parameters F  0 and Fx  0, the laissez-faire regime with zero Taylor rule
parameters (the origin of Figure 1) corresponds to a case such that  1 < 1 < 1 < 2,
to the left of the line p(1) = 0. This laissez-faire ("open-loop") private sectors model is
described by the Fed following a xed interest rate target or peg: it  i = 0. An increase
of the ination Taylor rule parameter F shifts the dynamic system from the area where
 1 < 1 < 1 < 2 with p(1) < 0 up to crossing the line p(1) = 0 to a an area where
1 < 1 < 2 with p(1) > 0. This is a saddle-node bifurcation between unstable systems
which are both having at least one unstable eigenvalue 2.
Proposition 1. For strictly positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution  > 0 and
a strictly positive slope of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve  > 0 and a positive discount
factor below one 0 <   1, a necessary condition for having two stable eigenvalues
( j1j < 1 and j2j < 1) in the closed-loop transition matrix of the New-Keynesian model
is that rule parameters (Fx; F) are inside in a stability triangle ABC such that the output
gap parameter is strictly negative (Fx < 0) and the ination rule parameter is larger than
one
 
F > 1 
 
1 


Fx > 1 or p(1) > 0

, according to the Taylor principle.
Proof. Eigenvalues are both stable (j1j < 1 and j2j < 1) if and only if p( 1) > 0,
p(1) > 0 and D < 1. The condition p(1) > 0 provides the Taylor principle condition. The
negative condition on the output gap Taylor rule parameter is obtained as follows. The
maximal value of the output gap Taylor rule parameter is necessarily on one of the apexes
of the stability triangle ABC which corresponds to intersections of p( 1) > 0, p(1) > 0
and D < 1. It turns out that the values of this parameter for the three points dening
the triangle are ordered as follows and that the largest one Fx(A) is strictly negative:
Fx(B) < Fx(C) < Fx(A) < 0:
Because  > 0,  > 0 and 0 <   1, one has:
 2  T (A)

<  T (A)

<
2  T (A)

< 0:
In particular, the largest value of the output gap Taylor rule parameter is negative
Fx(A) < 0 because  > 0 and 0 <   1:
If  > 0,  > 0 and 0 <   1 then Fx(A) < 0, 2 < T (A) = 1 + 1 + 

:
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Q.E.D.
Proposition 2. If  > 0,  > 0 and 0 <   1, then for policy rule parameters within
the stability triangle ABC (j1j < 1 and j2j < 1 if and only if p( 1) > 0, p(1) > 0 and
D < 1), the trace and determinant of the closed-loop system are lower than in the case of
the open-loop laissez-faire system, where 0 < 1 < 1 <
1
1
= 2: T (A+BF) < T (A)
and D (A+BF) < 1  D (A) = 1=.
Proof: As Fx =
T (A+BF) T (A)

< 0 in the stability triangle ABC, this implies that
T (A+BF) < T (A). A condition of the stability triangle is that the product of eigenval-
ues is smaller than one: D (A+BF) < 1. By contrast, the open-loop system determinant
is the inverse of the discount factor, which is at least equal to one: 1  D (A) = 1=,
hence D (A+BF) < 1  D (A) = 1=.
Q.E.D.
2.3 Negative versus Positive Feedback
The fact that a negative output gap Taylor rule parameter is a necessary condition for
the closed-loop dynamic system to have two eigenvalues within the unit circle, requires
further investigation. In this section, we explain how to distinguish negative feedback
from positive feedback in the scalar case. We explain how the sign of the negative
feedback policy rule parameter changes when the sign of the transmission mechanism
changes. We are then able to explain that, because of the intertemporal substitution
e¤ect of the interest rate on consumption in the transmission mechanism, a negative
output gap Taylor rule parameter corresponds to a negative feedback mechanism in the
Taylor rule. By contrast, with a delayed cost-of-capital mechanism, a positive output gap
Taylor rule parameter corresponds to a negative feedback mechanism of the Taylor rule.
Let us consider any rst order scalar case transmission mechanism model and a feed-
back rule for a policy target xt and a policy instrument it (rst order "single input, single
output", "SISO" case) with A, B and F real numbers:
xt+1 = Axt +Bit: Transmission mechanism; it = Fxt: Feedback rule
xt+1 = (A+BF )xt: Closed loop system; xt+1 = Axt: open-loop system (F = 0).
The closed-loop system is obtained after substitution of the feedback rule. The open-
loop system (or "laissez-faire") corresponds to no policy intervention: the feedback rule
parameter F is equal to zero.
Denition 3: A negative feedback stabilization mechanism is dened as a set of
stabilizing policy parameters such that the expectation of the gap of the target with respect
to its long-run equilibrium value with policy intervention is smaller than the expectation
of the gap of the target without intervention.
In the scalar case with a single input and a single output, the negative feedback
stabilization mechanism is obtained by the following set of policy rule parameters F :
fF 2 R; with F such that jA+BF j < min (1; jAj)g :
A negative feedback mechanism implies that jA+BF j < jAj, the policy rule pa-
rameter decreases the eigenvalue of the closed-loop dynamic system with respect to
the open-loop dynamic system. It accelerates convergence and decreases the endoge-
nous persistence (auto-correlation jA+BF j) of the policy target xt with respect to its
open-loop persistence measured by jAj. However, this may not lead to stabilization in
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the case where both jA+BF j and jAj are larger than one. In order to have negative
feedback and stabilization, one needs the closed-loop eigenvalue to be below one in ab-
solute value: jA+BF j < 1 < jAj. In this case, moving from negative feedback with
stabilization to laissez-faire corresponds to a saddle-node bifurcation if A is larger
than 1,  1 < A + BF < 1 < A, and to a a ip bifurcation if A is lower than  1,
A <  1 < A + BF < 1. In the case jA+BF j < jAj < 1, we have a negative feedback
mechanism, but there is no bifurcation because the open-loop system is already stable
(its eigenvalue jAj is in the unit circle).
Proposition 4. In the scalar case, for a positive open-loop auto-correlation of the
policy target A > 0, a change of sign of the marginal correlation B of the current policy
instrument it on the future value of the policy target xt+1 in the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism implies a change of sign of the negative feedback rule parameter F :
B > 0 implies F < 0 or B < 0 implies F > 0, because negative feedback implies that
BF < 0.
Proof.
jA+BF j < A)  A < A+BF < A)  2A < BF < 0: (12)
If B > 0)  2A
B
< F < 0 else if B < 0) 0 < F <  2A
B
.
QED.
In other words, inspecting only of the sign of the parameter F of the proportional
feedback rule is not a proof of negative feedback mechanism, one needs to inspect the
sign of the transmission mechanism parameter B = and check that BF < 0.
negative feedback implies bounded feedback rule parameters on both sides, and not
only an asymmetric boundary condition such as the Taylor principle (F > 1). An
excessive opposite feedback reaction would lead to a lower closed-loop eigenvalue than
an opposite sign of the open-loop eigenvalue A + BF <  A if A > 0. It could lead to
instability in the case where A+BF <  1 <  A, if A > 0.
When a loss function includes a quadratic cost on the volatility of the policy instru-
ment, the reduced form of the optimal policy feedback rule parameter F does not change
the sign of the eigenvalue with respect to the open-loop eigenvalue. Else, it would lead
to more volatility of the policy instrument for the same absolute value of the eigenvalue
of the policy target. Hence, the range of variation of the policy instrument is such that
0  A+BF < A and  2A <  A  BF < 0 (see Chatelain and Ralf (2016) for Ramsey
optimal policy with a scalar case model). In this paper, the area of Ramsey optimal pol-
icy reduced form rule parameters remains on the same side of the center of the stability
triangle (see Ramsey optimal policy section).
Proposition 5. If  > 0,  > 0 and 0 <   1, a negative Taylor rule parameter on
the output gap Fx < 0 is a necessary condition for a negative feedback mechanism in the
New-Keynesian model.
Proof. The New-Keynesian transition matrix is:
Etxt+1
Ett+1

=

1 + 

+ Fx    + F
 

1


xt
t

:
Let us consider a particular initial output gap shock where x0 > 0 and 0 = 0. We
consider this particular case, because we only seek a necessary condition in order to pro-
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vide an economic intuition explaining why the output gap rule parameter is negative for
negative feedback. The necessary and su¢cient conditions have been given in proposition
1: they dene the stability triangle.
With the output gap shock where x0 > 0 and 0 = 0, the output equation corresponds
to the scalar case. Negative feedback mechanism implies that the expectation of the
output gap with policy intervention E0x1 should be lower than the expectation of next
periods output gap without policy intervention E0x1;Fx=0:
E0x1 =

1 +


+ Fx

x0 < E0x1;Fx=0 =

1 +



x0 , Fx < 0
Since  > 0 this implies Fx < 0. Because of the intertemporal substitution e¤ect on
consumption B =  > 0, a rise of the interest rate goes hand in hand with a rise of
future output gap. Hence, negative feedback implies a negative output gap-Taylor-rule
parameter F = Fx < 0.
Q.E.D.
2.4 Alternative Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism
This section seeks an alternative ad hoc monetary policy transmission mechanism such
that negative feedback is compatible with a positive output gap rule parameter and a
positive ination Taylor rule parameter.
In the New-Keynesian model, the production function does not depend on capital.
Hence, the monetary policy transmission channel of the cost of capital is assumed away.
Central bankers often believe that, for a positive output gap, a rise of the interest rate
leads to a fall of current output gap which leads to a fall of future ination. For example,
Taylor (1999) assumes no intertemporal substitution e¤ect ( = 0) but a negative e¤ect
of the user cost of capital on current output taking into account current ination instead
of expected ination in the cost of capital. He also assumes an accelerationist Phillips
curve e¤ect, with an opposite negative correlation of future ination with current output:
xt =  a (it   t) and t+1 = t + bxt = t   ab (it   t) , with a > 0, b =   > 0:
This dynamic system has only one dimension. It is similar to the extreme case of
the New-Keynesian Phillips curve where all labor is nanced by working capital so that
i = ab > 0 (Christiano et al. (2010), Bratsiotis and Robinson (2016)). Future ination
is negatively correlated with the cost of working capital and not at all with the cost
of labor. Because there is only one recursive dimension, the Taylor rule responds only
to ination: it = Ft. The closed-loop system converges faster than the open-loop
(negative feedback) if and only if the ination Taylor rule parameter is larger than one
(Taylor principle) and bounded from above:
 t < t+1 = (1 + ab  abF) t < t ,  2  ab <  abF <  ab,
1 < F < 1 +
2
ab
:
Now, let us introduce a second recursive dimension for the output gap besides ination
dynamics, namely an ad hoc delayed cost-of-capital e¤ect. An increase of the interest rate
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leads to a decrease of future production ( < 0). Based on microeconomic foundations
assuming that some agents face credit rationing or limited asset market participation,
this negative aggregate intertemporal elasticity of substitution is found in heterogeneous
agents New-Keynesian models (Bilbiie (2008), Bilbiie and Straub (2013)). Empirically,
Havranek (2015) and Havranek et al. (2015) found near zero estimates at macro level
or negative estimates of  for some countries in their meta-analysis. Mavroeidis et al.
(2014) found hundreds of negative estimates of  using USA data.
Proposition 6. For 0 <   1 and for the alternative transmission mechanism,  <
0,  < 0, a necessary condition for having two stable eigenvalues ( j1j < 1 and j2j < 1)
in the closed-loop transition matrix of the New-Keynesian model is that rule parame-
ters (Fx; F) are inside a stability triangle such that the output gap parameter is strictly
positive (Fx > 0) and the ination rule parameter is above one
 
F > 1 
 
1 


Fx

, ac-
cording to the Taylor principle.
Proof. Same computations as for Proposition 2 with opposite signs for  and .
The stability triangle in Figure 2 with opposite sign restrictions  < 0 and  < 0, is
symmetric to the stability triangle of Figure 1 with respect to the horizontal axis in the
positive quadrant of (Fx,F). The economic intuition is that a rise of the interest rate
today implies a fall of next periods output which implies a fall of ination two-period
from now. Then, negative feedback implies a positive output gap Taylor rule parameter.
2.5 Determinacy with Forward-looking Interest Rate
This section investigates why determinacy in the New-Keynesian model with a Taylor rule
seeks two unstable eigenvalues and hence recommends a positive feedback mechanism for
the central bank to stabilize the output gap and ination.
Blanchard and Kahns (1980) condition for the solution of a linear rational expecta-
tions dynamic system to be determinate (unique) is that the number of predetermined
variables should be equal to the number of stable eigenvalues. In this paper, which vari-
ables are backward-looking (predetermined) and which are forward-looking, however, is
an ad hoc choice of the researcher as it was the rule in ad hoc rational expectations
models of the 1970s (Chatelain and Ralf (2019c)).
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) acknowledge that their determinacy condition is always
satised for optimal growth and optimal control with a linear quadratic regulator when
concavity conditions are satised. In this case, the ad hoc matrix of the linear rational
expectations system is replaced by the symplectic matrix of a Hamiltonian system derived
from optimal conditions with Lagrange multipliers. A symplectic matrix (its transpose
is similar to its inverse) is such that the number of unstable eigenvalues is equal to the
number of stable eigenvalues. The fact that a state variable or a costate variable is
forward-looking or predetermined is endogenously derived from optimal control or the
dynamic Stackelberg game program and its transversality conditions. The number of
predetermined variables is equal to the number of forward-looking variables.
The New-Keynesian model is a hybrid model of optimal behavior for the private sector
and of ad hoc behavior for the policy maker described by a policy instrument (the interest
rate) which reacts to private sector variables according to an ad hoc feedback Taylor rule.
The fact that the output gap and ination are forward-looking is endogenously derived
from the private sectors optimal control program. By contrast, the assumption that the
interest rate and its lag are forward-looking variables is an ad hoc choice by a researcher.
A researcher could as well select the opposite assumption that the interest and its lag
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are predetermined variables. It is only an arbitrary assumption as it was done in ad hoc
rational expectations models in the 1970s.
Using only Blanchard and Kahns (1980) condition, it is not possible to prove that
policy makers instruments of feedback rules are necessarily forward-looking. To prove
this would require a model of intertemporal optimal behavior by the policy maker. But,
consistent with negative feedback mechanism, Ramsey optimal policy proves the opposite:
policy instruments are backward-looking when policy targets are forward-looking.
In the New-Keynesian model, the two policy targets (ination and output gap) are
forward-looking variables, because they are costate variables of private sector optimal
intertemporal behavior. In a second step, the New-Keynesian theory uses the ad hoc
assumption that the policy instrument (interest rate) in the Taylor rule is a forward-
looking variable. As seen in the next section, Ramsey optimal policy implies something
else: the policy instrument (interest rate) and its lag are backward-looking variables,
because the two policy targets (ination and output gap) are forward-looking variables.
Once it is assumed that the interest rate is forward-looking as well as ination and the
output gap, and once it is assumed that the predetermined variable of the private sector
(wealth or public debt) is set to zero in all periods (Gali (2015), footnote 3), the model is a
degenerate rational expectations model without predetermined variable. In this case, any
shock leads to an instantaneous jump back to the long-run equilibrium value of ination
and output which is the only available anchor. Hence, there is no transitory dynamics.
There is neither a need for stabilization policy nor for a feedback Taylor rule.
In order to introduce transitory dynamics, a New-Keynesian convention is to add ad
hoc autoregressive components to the cost-push shock and to the output gap shock. The
expectations of these two autoregressive components provide two predetermined variables
with transitory dynamics on which ination and the output gap can be anchored. The
fact that these anchors are not observable may be worrisome for central bank practitioners
who usually anchor ination on observable variables, such as their policy instruments.
Once the decision is taken by the researcher on which variables are forward-looking,
Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition for ad hoc rational expectations lin-
ear systems is applied mechanically. The number of stable eigenvalues should be equal
to the number of predetermined variables. There are two exogenous predetermined vari-
ables with their own stable eigenvalues corresponding to their auto-correlation parame-
ters. There are three endogenous forward-looking variables (output gap, ination and the
interest rate) whose dynamics corresponds to a closed-loop endogenous system including
a feedback Taylor rule in two dimensions. This implies that this two dimensional system
should have two unstable eigenvalues. Hence, the determinacy area in the plane of the
policy rule parameters corresponds to the areas where there are two unstable eigenvalues
(regions 4.3 and 4.4 with D > 1 and region 2 in Figure 1).
Because the Taylor rule parameters determine the stability or instability of eigen-
values, as a particular case of Wonhams (1967) pole placement theorem, when they
force eigenvalues to be unstable instead of stable, they correspond to a positive feedback
mechanism in the sense of control.
The determinacy area includes unlikely unbounded areas which are allowed by the
positive feedback mechanism following the arbitrary assumption that the interest rate
and its lag are forward-looking:
Region 2, rst case: Negative unbounded output gap rule parameter Fx < 0 but
where the ination rule parameter is positive but does not satisfy the Taylor principle is
satised for the ination rule parameter 0 < F < 1.
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Region 2, second case: Negative unbounded output gap rule parameter Fx < 0 and
negative unbounded ination rule parameter F < 0.
Region 4, second case: Negative unbounded output gap rule parameter Fx < 0 even
though the Taylor principle is satised for unbounded large ination rule parameter
F > 1:
Region 4, third case: Unlikely unbounded positive rule parameters F > 2, Fx > 1.
These guidelines suggest contradictory and unbounded values for Taylor rule parame-
ters. They are hardly believable to policy-makers. Hence, New-Keynesian theory requires
additional ad hoc boundary restrictions in order to remain in the subset of the determi-
nacy region with plausible parameters 1 < F < 2 and 0  Fx < 1. This area is similar
to the condition found in the Taylor model based on the cost of capital and negative
feedback mechanism for the ination Taylor rule parameter: 1 < F < 1 +
2
ab
. But the
signs of the transmission mechanism on the output gap and of the feedback mechanism
are the opposite.
2.6 Determinacy with Predetermined Interest Rate
Let us still assume a Taylor rule. But, as an alternative thought experiment, we can
assume that, besides the two predetermined autoregressive forcing variables, the interest
rate is arbitrarily predetermined as well as its lag, with given initial values i0 and i1
(or i0 and i 1). This assumption is no more or no less theoretically grounded than the
alternative ad hoc assumption of the previous section. Then the model includes four
predetermined variables. Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition implies
that four eigenvalues should be stable. The endogenous two-dimensional system should
be stable. This time, the determinacy area shifts to the stability triangle with negative
feedback mechanism.
Once initial values of the interest rate are given, the problem of sunspot indeterminacy
does not occur, because initial values of the forward-looking policy target are anchored
on the two values of the interest rate by the Taylor rule (similar computations can be
done for i0 and i 1):
i0 = Fxx0 + F0
i1 = Eti1 = Et (Fxx1 + F1) =
 
Fx F
 1 + 

+ Fx    + F
 

1


x0
0

i1 =

Fx

Fx +


 + 1

  

F
1

F + Fx

F   1
  x0
0

:
One solves the linear system:

i1
i0

=
 
Fx

Fx +


 + 1

  

F
1

F + Fx

F   1

Fx F
!
x0
0

:
Initial values of forward-looking variables are anchored as follows:
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
x0
0

=
 
Fx

Fx +


 + 1

  

F
1

F + Fx

F   1

Fx F
!
 1
i1
i0

:
They exclude sunspots although the equilibrium is a sink. The determinacy area is
the bounded stability triangle represented in Figure 1.
Consider now Figure 2, with an alternative transmission mechanism: a delayed cost of
capital and an accelerationist Phillips curve  < 0,  < 0. Assume that the interest rate
and its lag are predetermined. The determinacy area is now a bounded triangle where the
Taylor principle is satised for the ination Taylor rule parameter and where the output
gap Taylor rule parameter is positive.
By contrast, the determinacy area with the New-Keynesian transmission mechanism
 > 0,  > 0 assuming the interest rate and its lag to be forward looking, includes a
wide range of unbelievable unbounded areas, where Taylor rule parameters are too large
and/or have negative signs.
3 RAMSEY OPTIMAL POLICY
For the New-Keynesian transmission mechanism of section 2, Gianonni and Woodford
(2003) analyze Ramsey optimal policy in a model with an innite time horizon. Kara
(2007) computes Ramsey optimal policy with a probability to renege commitment in
each period. The key change with respect to the innite horizon model is that the
discount factor is now multiplied by the probability of not reneging commitment 0 <
q  1, so that the range of values of this "credibility augmented discount factor", 0 <
q  1, is much larger than for the discount factor alone: 0:98 <   1. Several
names have been given to this kind of policy: "stochastic replanning" (Roberds, 1987) or
"quasi commitment" (Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007, Kara 2007). The assumption is
observationally equivalent to Chari and Kehoes (1990) optimal policy under sustainable
plans, facing a punishment threat at a given horizon in case of deviation from an optimal
plan (Fujiwara, Kam, Sunakawa (2019)). The discretionary equilibrium where the central
bank re-optimizes continuously without any credibility (q = 0) is a point of measure
zero with respect to the continuous interval q 2 ]0; 1]. Since Ramsey optimal policy
under quasi-commitment includes the case of very low credibility such as q = 10 7 the
discretionary equilibrium is not a relevant equilibrium (Chatelain and Ralf (2018b)).
The contribution of this section is to use an intermediate step of Chatelain and Ralfs
(2019a) algorithm in order to locate the full range of reduced form Taylor rule parameters
of Ramsey optimal policy when varying the central bank preferences in the plane of Taylor
rule parameters.
The policy maker minimizes the expectation of the present value W of a discounted
quadratic loss function Lt over a nite horizon T  3. He chooses the interest rate with
respect to the policy targets (ination and the output gap) with a positive weight on
the second policy target (output gap) x  0 and a weight normalized to one,  = 1,
for ination (the limit case  = 0 can also be taken into account). We have a strictly
positive adjustment cost parameter i > 0 on the volatility of the policy instrument (the
interest rate) and a discount factor :
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E (W ) =  Et
TX
t=0
t


2t
2
+ x
x2t
2
+ i
i2t
2

; T  3; (13)
subject to the private sectors New-Keynesian four equations model (equations (1) to
(4)), with initial conditions for the predetermined state variables and natural boundary
conditions for the private sectors forward variables. Denoting Lagrangian multipliers x;t
for the consumption Euler equation and ;t for the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, the
Lagrangian L is:
L =  E0
TX
t=0
t{
2t
2
+ x
x2t
2
+ i
i2t
2
(14)
+x;t [xt   xt+1 +  (it   t+1)] + ;t [t   tt+1   xt] }.
The law of iterated expectations has been used to eliminate the expectations that ap-
peared in each constraint. Because of the certainty equivalence principle for determining
optimal policy in the linear quadratic regulator including additive normal random shocks
(Simon (1956)), the expectations of random variables ut are set to zero and do not appear
in the Lagrangian.
Since ination and the output gap are assumed to be forward-looking, they are opti-
mally chosen at the initial date t = 0 and at the nal date t = T according to transver-
sality conditions, also called natural boundary conditions:
;t=0 = x;t=0 = ;t=T = x;t=T = 0 (Transversality conditions). (15)
The Hamiltonian system with Lagrange multipliers of the linear quadratic regulator
includes two stable roots and two unstable roots:
xt = xt+1 +  (it   t+1) (16)
t = tt+1 + xt (17)
@L
@t
= 0) t + ;t   ;t 1   

x;t 1 = 0 for 0  t  T; (18)
@L
@xt
= 0) xxt   ;t + x;t   1

x;t 1 = 0 for 0  t  T: (19)
A bounded optimal plan is a set of bounded processes ft; xt;it; x;t; ;tg for date 0 
t  T of the Hamiltonian system that satisfy the four monetary transmission mechanism
equations, the rst order equations, and the optimal initial conditions.
The link between the Lagrange multipliers and the interest rate is given by:
@L
@it
= 0) iit + x;t = 0) x;t =  i

it for 0  t  T:
The boundary conditions and the marginal conditions lead to the following constraints
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on the interest rate:
@L
@it
= 0) iit + x;t = 0) x;t =  i

it for 0  t  T; (20)
;t=0 = x;t=0 = ;t=T = x;t=T = 0 hence (21)
i 1 = i 2 = 0 = iT 1 = iT 2 (i0 6= 0 for the shortest horizon T = 3). (22)
Using the method of undetermined coe¢cients, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chap-
ter 19.3.1, step 1, p.769) solve a Riccati equation which allows to compute endogenous
optimal negative feedback rule parameters (Fx;R; F;R). Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan
and Sargent (1996, p.203) consider that autoregressive shocks are initially set to zero
(z0 = 0) to solve this Riccati equation. They do not depend on autoregressive parame-
ters of exogenous variables. Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996, p.203)
take into account the exogenous autoregressive process of forcing variables. They solve
the rule parameter responding to shocks Fz;R; Fu;R. This step-one representation of the
Ramsey optimal policy rule depends on all four variables of the private sector:
it = Fxxt + Ft + Fzzt + Fuut: (23)
Besides the two stable eigenvalues of the block of endogenous variables, there are
the two stable eigenvalues that correspond to the autoregressive parameters of the block
of the two predetermined and exogenous forcing variables (productivity and cost-push
shock).
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19, step 2) compute the linear stable subspace
constraint between Lagrange multipliers (in this paper: x;t; ;t) and the variables of the
private sector: t = Pyyt + Pzzt. The matrix Py is the unique solution of a discrete-
time Riccati equation (Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), chapter 19) and Pz is the unique
solution of a Sylvester equation in the augmented discounted linear quadratic regulator
(Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996), pp. 202-204).
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19, step 3) substitute the forward-looking
variables (in this paper: xt; t) in the rule by their Lagrange multipliers (in this paper:
x;t; ;t) using the linear constraint t = Pyyt+Pzzt. This representation of the Ramsey
optimal policy rule is a function of four predetermined variables (t; zt) which are not
observable.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19, step 4) nally solve for the optimal initial
anchor of forward-looking variables on predetermined variables:
t = Pyyt +Pzzt, 0 = 0, Py invertible () y0 =  P 1y Pzz0. (24)
Furthermore, Ljunqgvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19.3.7) mention another repre-
sentation of a Ramsey optimal policy rule which depends on lags of the policy instruments
and predetermined variables.
In the article of Giannoni and Woodford (2003) a di¤erent Ramsey optimal policy rule
which depends on lags of policy instruments and of forward-looking variables (ination
and the output gap) is presented. All variables are observable. The predetermined
autoregressive forcing variables (zt; ut) are substituted by a one period lag and a two
period lag of the interest rate (it 1; it 2). Chatelain and Ralf (2018c) demonstrate that
the sum of parameters of the lags of funds rate is smaller than one for this representation
of the solution of Ramsey optimal policy, so that Giannoni and Woodford (2003) "super-
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inertial" policy rules are ruled out. Other observationally equivalent representations of
the Ramsey optimal policy rule may use leads or lags of other variables than the policy
instrument.
All these various representations of Ramsey optimal policy rules correspond to linear
substitutions of the variables which are taken as the set of basis vectors. They are all
observationally equivalent taking into account the other equations of the stable solution
of the Hamiltonian system. The eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian system are invariant to
these changes of basis related to a change of representation of the rule of Ramsey optimal
policy.
Step 1 representation of the rule of Ramsey optimal policy, with ination and output
gap as rule parameters (for z0 = 0), corresponds to the representation of Figure 1 showing
bifurcations and areas for stable and unstable eigenvalues. For each of the innite number
of other observationally equivalent representations of the rule of Ramsey optimal policy,
including leads or lags and/or linear changes of variables (basis vectors) within the stable
subspace of Ramsey optimal policy, a similar Figure can be drawn to highlight stability
and bifurcations.
Proposition 7. The Taylor rule parameters on ination and on the output gap in
Ljunqgvist and Sargents (2012, Chapter 19) step 1 representation are located in a subset
of the stability triangle of Section 2, which is located on the left-hand side of the center
of the stability triangle. This center corresponds to both eigenvalues equal to zero.
Proof. Ramsey optimal policy assumes that ination and the output gap are forward-
looking and that the policy instrument (the interest rate) and its lag are predetermined.
Two stable eigenvalues in the block of two endogenous variables of the New-Keynesian
model are required to satisfy Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition. The
reduced form Taylor rule parameters have to lie in the area where both eigenvalues are
stable, that is, in the stability triangle.
Q.E.D.
The key principle is that negative feedback mechanism is stabilizing forward-looking
variables, such as output and ination, during a nite short horizon (the duration of a
monetary policy regime), leaning against ination and output gap spirals.
For a numerical example, Table 2 and Figure 3 provide the boundaries of the triangle
of the linear quadratic regulator (LQR) reduced form Taylor rule parameters, obtained by
a simulation grid, varying the weights in the loss function in three dimensions. The sides
of the LQR triangle correspond to the cases where the central bank minimizes only the
variance of ination (ination nutter) without taking into account the zero lower bound
constraint on the policy interest rate (i = 10
 7 > 0), or minimizes only the variance of
output gap without taking into account the zero lower bound (i = 10
 7 > 0), or seeks
only maximal inertia of the policy rate (i ! +1).
Table 2: Step 1: LQR rule parameters for  = 0:1,  = 0:5,  = 0:99, z = u = 0:9.
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Minimize only:  x i j1j j2j F Fx Fz Fu
Ination 1 0 10 7 7:10 5 0:006 21:21  3:92  2:01 39:5
Ination output gap 4 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:819 4:76  2:27  2:01 17:6
Ination output gap 1 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:905 3:03  2:10  2:01 12:8
Ination output gap 1=4 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:951 2:10  2:01  2:01 8:90
Output gap 0 1 10 7 4:10 7 0:995 1:21  1:92  2:01 2:95
Output gap interest 0 4 1 0:348 0:953 1:70  1:31  2:21 6:78
Output gap interest 0 1 1 0:541 0:918 1:83  0:98  2:43 7:38
Output gap interest 0 1=4 1 0:663 0:878 1:87  0:82  2:42 7:55
Interest rate 0 0 1(+1) 0:748 0:833 1:89  0:74  2:46 7:60
Ination interest 1=4 0 1 0:784 0:784 1:99  0:77  2:43 7:85
Ination interest 1 0 1 0:772 0:772 2:22  0:83  2:37 8:45
Ination interest 4 0 1 0:742 0:742 2:82  0:98  2:26 9:95
The LQR triangle is contained within the stability triangle, see Figure 3. A similar
analysis can be made for the alternative monetary policy transmission mechanism with
 < 0 and  < 0, see Figure 4.
An example of nding the optimal initial anchor, step 4 in the Ljungqvist and Sargent
approach is given in Table 3. Here the columns below x0 and below 0 indicate the weights
of z0 and u0 in the VAR.
Table 3: Step 4: optimal initial anchors,  = 0:1;  = 0:5;  = 0:99; z;x = z; = 0:9.
Minimize only:  x i x0 0
Ination 1 0 10 7 10 4z0   10:1u0 10 5z0 + 10 6u0
Ination output gap 4 1 10 7 10 6z0   1:25u0 10 8z0 + 3:14u0
Ination output gap 1 1 10 7 10 6z0   0:49u0 10 8z0 + 4:91u0
Ination output gap 1=4 1 10 7 10 6z0   0:16u0 10 6z0 + 6:66u0
Output gap 0 1 10 7 10 6z0 + 10
 6u0  10 6z0 + 9:61u0
Output gap interest 0 4 1 0:35z0 + 1:53u0  0:56z0 + 7:18u0
Output gap interest 0 1 1 0:58z0 + 2:52u0  0:79z0 + 6:20u0
Output gap interest 0 1=4 1 0:72z0 + 3:13u0  0:92z0 + 5:63u0
Interest rate 0 0 1(+1) 0:73z0 + 3:14u0  0:92z0 + 5:63u0
Ination interest 1=4 0 1 5:00z0   10:3u0 0:71z0   0:04u0
Ination interest 1 0 1 4:45z0   10:3u0 0:61z0   0:03u0
Ination interest 4 0 1 3:45z0   10:2u0 0:42z0   0:02u0
This leads to the following observations:
- When the central bank is an ination nutter, both eigenvalues are close to zero
(point 
 in Figure 3 corresponds to the case when both eigenvalues are exactly equal to
zero). To stabilize ination in the second step of the transmission mechanism, one has to
stabilize the output gap in the rst step. The optimal anchor leads to an initial jump of
ination to zero, whereas the output gap jump is not zero.
- The lower side of the LQR triangle corresponds to the no-lower-bound constraint (no
cost of changing the policy rate) and to changes of the relative weight on the output gap
variance with respect to ination variance. The lower the weight  for a given weight x,
the lower F, the response of the interest rate to ination in the Taylor rule, the larger
the initial jump of ination, the lower the initial jump of the output gap.
- When the central bank is an output gap nutter, one eigenvalue is zero (related
to output gap stabilization in next period based on the Euler consumption equation).
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However, the other eigenvalue tends to one when the weight of ination is zero. There
is no margin of errors on the ination Taylor rule parameters with respect to the saddle-
node bifurcation This second eigenvalue is related to the New-Keynesian Phillips curve
and the autoregressive parameter of ination, which only occurs in the second period of
the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
- The upper left side of the LQR triangle (closest to the saddle-node bifurcation)
corresponds to a weight  = 0 for ination and rising relative cost of changing the
policy instruments with respect to the output gap weight. The lower the weight x for a
given weight on the policy instrument i, the higher F the response of interest rate to
ination in the Taylor rule, the lower the initial jump of ination, the larger the initial
jump of the output gap. "Mostly ination eigenvalue" decreases from 0:995 to 0:833.
"Mostly output gap eigenvalue" increases from zero to 0:748, see Table 2.
- When the central bank uses minimum energy control (it minimizes only the volatility
of its policy instrument (or "input"): x =  = 0, i > 0), the eigenvalue 0:748
corresponds to the stable eigenvalue of laissez-faire matrix
p
Ayy and the second stable
eigenvalue 0:833 = 1=1:20 is the inverse of the unstable eigenvalue 1:20 of the laissez-faire
matrix
p
Ayy.
- The upper right side of the LQR triangle corresponds to zero weight on the output
gap, and a relative increase of the weight of ination with respect to the weight of the
policy instrument. The higher the weight  for a given weight on the policy instrument
i, the ination Taylor rule parameter rises from 1:89 to 21:2 (ination nutter case). The
ination initial jump decreases toward zero.
4 HOPF BIFURCATION
As has been seen in the previous section, di¤erent emphasis of monetary policy on in-
ation, output gap, and the interest rate lead to di¤erent eigenvalues of the dynamic
system and therefore to di¤erent stability properties. As a result, we can state the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 8. Shifting from Ramsey optimal policy (where the interest rate and its
lag are predetermined variables) to a New-Keynesian Taylor rule with plausible Taylor
rule parameters (e.g., 1 < F < 2 and 0 < Fx < 1) (where the interest rate and its
lag are forward-looking variables), when the Taylor principle is satised in both regimes,
corresponds to a Hopf bifurcation (crossing D = 1 for T 2 4D < 0) in the New-Keynesian
model.
Proof.
The interest rate and its lag are optimally predetermined in a regime of Ramsey opti-
mal policy, whereas they are arbitrarily assumed to be forward-looking in the determinate
solution of the New-Keynesian model with a Taylor rule.
For Ramsey optimal policy, the number of predetermined variables is equal to four
when the two predetermined forcing variables are taken into account. In the case of
determinacy in the new Keynesian model with a Taylor rule, this number is reduced to
two, namely only the two forcing variables.
This implies that the controllable part of the New-Keynesian model includes two
stable eigenvalues with Ramsey optimal policy. The policy rule parameters lie in the
stability triangle ABC bounded by p(1) > 0, p( 1) > 0 and D < 1, regions 4.1 and 4.2
in Figure 1. See also Figure 5 for a detailed view of a smaller range of possible parameter
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values.
By contrast, in the New-Keynesian model we have no stable eigenvalue. The determi-
nacy regions are contained in regions 4.3 and 4.4 with p(1) < 0 and p( 1) < 0 either with
conjugate complex or real eigenvalues larger than one in absolute values. As a plausible
area for Taylor rule parameters 1 < F < 2 and 0 < Fx < 1 are given, see purple area in
Figure 5.
Because both policy rules are in region 4 above saddle-node and ip bifurcation limits,
dened by p(1) > 0 and p( 1) > 0, when modelers shift their theory on central bank
behavior from Ramsey policy to New-Keynesian determinacy with Taylor rule they move
from the red area inside the stablity triangle to the purple area outside the triangle, see
Figure 5. Their change of theory corresponds to a Hopf bifurcation, crossing the Hopf
bifurcation border D = 1, line AB in Figures 1 and 5.
Q.E.D.
5 CHANGING THE HYPOTHESES ON SHOCKS
The zero variance of shocks covers two factors: the variance of the random i.i.d. compo-
nent "z;t and the auto-correlation  specic to forcing variables. In what follows we will
briey discuss how changes of these hypotheses a¤ect the results.
Zero variance of the i.i.d. components "z;t and "u;t with a non-zero auto-
correlation of forcing variables
For the New-Keynesian Taylor rule, this does not change the results because ination
and output gap can be anchored on deterministic autoregressive forcing variables.
For Ramsey optimal policy, this does not change the results, because the optimal
endogenous policy rule parameters do not depend on the variance of shocks in the case
of the augmented linear quadratic regulator. This is the certainty equivalent principle in
the case of quadratic optimization subject to a linear dynamic system (Simon (1956)).
Zero autocorrelation of both forcing variables zt and ut, with a non-zero
variance of the i.i.d. components "z;t and "u;t.
For the New-Keynesian Taylor rule, there are two forward-looking variables that are
not predetermined. We then get a degenerate rational expectations equilibrium. As soon
as shocks "z;t and "u;t are known, ination and output gap instantaneously jump back
to their respective long-run steady-state value, which is the only anchor available. This
implies that the interest rate never deviates from its long-run steady-state value. The
Taylor rule cannot be estimated. The long run steady state for output gap and ination
is a source for the Taylor rule parameters chosen in the New-Keynesian determinacy area
(region 4 with D > 1 and region 2).
For Ramsey optimal policy, there are two predetermined Lagrange multipliers set to
zero, which optimally predetermine the interest rate and its lag. The optimal anchors of
ination and the output gap at the initial date (stacked in the vector y0) are given by
y0 =  P 1y Pzz0, where z0 corresponds to the expectations of both autoregressive forcing
variables. With zero auto-correlation, this expectation is equal to zero for both shocks.
Hence, z0 = 0 = y0. The optimal initial anchor is also the long run steady state value of
ination and the output gap. The optimal interest rate never deviates from its long run
steady state value: this is how it is predetermined at the initial date. The reduced form
Taylor rule parameters for ination and the output gap are di¤erent from zero (Fy 6= 0).
But if both auto-correlation coe¢cients are equal to zero, i = 0) Fz = 0, the interest
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rate does not respond to non-autoregressive shocks. This is consistent with Simons (1956)
certainty equivalence principle. The long run steady state for output gap and ination is
a sink for the Taylor rule parameters chosen in the Ramsey optimal policy determinacy
area (region 4 with D < 1). This equilibrium corresponds to degenerate Ramsey optimal
policy.
Zero auto-correlation of only one of the forcing variables (ut).
For the New-Keynesian Taylor rule, there are two forward-looking forcing variables
for one predetermined forcing variable. For all periods, both, ination and the output
gap, are linear functions of zt: t = Nzt and xt = Nxzt. Hence, the output gap is a
linear function of ination xt = NxN
 1
 t. The recursive dynamic system boils down to a
dynamic system of dimension one. The feedback rule needs to respond to only one linear
combination of the two policy targets. This implies selecting one linear identication
restriction for the Taylor rule parameters among an innity of possibilities: Fx = F
with  2 R or F = 0. For F = 0 and Fx 6= 0, the Taylor rule responds only to the output
gap (it = Fxxt) which seemingly contradicts ination targeting. It is observationally
equivalent to another policy rule it = FxNxN
 1
 t, where we dene F;2 = FxNxN
 1
 6= 0
and Fx;2 = 0, which describes "ination targeting" and seemingly contradicts an output
gap stabilization objective. Assuming a unique predetermined variable for two forward-
looking variables forces the coincidence that both forward-looking variables are exactly
collinear. This assumption cannot "demonstrate" ination targeting and deny an output
gap stabilization objective, because they are exactly equivalent. The determinacy area
for Taylor rule parameters is unchanged (region 4 with D > 1 and region 2), but the
chosen identication restriction has to be taken into account .
For Ramsey optimal policy, additional to the two forward-looking variables for one
predetermined forcing variable there are two backward-looking Lagrange multipliers on
ination and on the output gap set to zero at the initial date. At the date of the initial
optimization, both, initial ination and initial output gap, are anchored as linear functions
to the initial value of the unique forcing variable z0, according to the formula: y0 =
 P 1y Pzz0. Hence, at the initial date, the output gap is a linear function of ination.
But, during all the periods where the central bank does not re-optimize, the recursive
dynamic system boils down to a dynamic system of dimension three. The feedback rule
responds to output gap and ination with unchanged formula for Fy. The determinacy
area for Ramsey optimal policy is unchanged (region 4 with D < 1). Since the auto-
correlation coe¢cient is now zero, the feedback rule responds only to the shock zt with a
parameter Fz found by solving a scalar Sylvester equation. The identication restriction
is then Fu = 0, which is implied by u = 0 in a Sylvester equation of the augmented
linear quadratic regulator.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we derived the dynamic properties of New-Keynesian Taylor rule policy
and Ramsey optimal policy. Stability, determinacy, and anchors of policy variables were
compared. According to the choice of the policy parameters, namely, the Taylor rule
parameters corresponding to the ination and the output target, the steady state can be
a source or a sink with real or complex eigenvalues. Changing the policy doctrine and as a
consequence the policy parameters, may change the stability properties, and bifurcations
are possible. Moving in particular from Ramsey optimal policy to a New-Keynesian
23
Taylor rule can be interpreted as a Hopf bifurcation.
Ramsey optimal policy can also take into account monetary and scal policy (Cardani
et al. (2018), Gomis-Porqueras and Zhang (2019), Chatelain and Ralf (2019d, 2019e)).
Further research may test these models, following Chatelain and Ralf (2017) tests and
estimations in the case where the transmission mechanism is only the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve. A key insight is that positive feedback stabilization policy requires more
structural parameters to t the data than negative feedback stabilization policy (Chate-
lain and Ralf (2018a)). This may lead to parameter identication issue (Chatelain and
Ralf (2014)).
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APPENDIX A: Scilab code
Download the open source software Scilab and copy and paste the following code in the
command window, for given preferences of the central bank (Qpi, Qx, R) and given mon-
etary policy transmission mechanism parameters (beta1, gamma1, kappa, rho1, rho2).
Transition matrix is multiplied by
p
 in order to take into account discounting as
proposed by Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996). Formulas for Riccati,
Sylvester and rule parameters are taken in Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent
(1996).
Qpi=4;Qx=0;R=1;Qxpi=0;
beta1=0.99; gamma1=0.5; kappa=0.1;
rho1=0.9; rho2=0.9; rho12=0;
Qxrho1=0; Qpirho1=0;
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Qxrho2=0; Qpirho2 =0;
A1=[1-(kappa*gamma1/beta1) -gamma1/beta1 ; -kappa/beta1 1/beta1] ;
A=sqrt(beta1)*A1;
B1=[gamma1 ; 0];
B=sqrt(beta1)*B1;
Q=[Qx Qxpi ;Qxpi Qpi ];
Big=sysdiag(Q,R);
[w,wp]=fullrf(Big);
C1=wp(:,1:2);
D12=wp(:,3:$);
M=syslin(d,A,B,C1,D12);
[Fy,Py]=lqr(M);
A+B*Fy;
Py
Fy
spec(A+B*Fy)
abs(spec(A+B*Fy))
A+B*Fy
A
B
Ayz=[-1 gamma1/beta1 ; 0 -1/beta1 ];
Azz=[rho1 rho12; rho12 rho2 ];
Qyz=[Qxrho1 Qpirho1 ; Qxrho2 Qpirho2 ];
BS=-Azz;
AS=(A+B*Fy);
CS=Qyz+AS*Py*Ayz;
Pz=sylv(AS, BS, CS, d);
AS*Pz*BS+Pz-CS;
norm (AS*Pz*BS+Pz-CS);
N=-inv(Py)*Pz;
Fz=inv(R+B*Py*B)*B*(Py*Ayz + Pz*Azz);
sp1=spec(A+B*Fy)
sp1t=sp1
Py
Pz
Spectrum=[sp1t rho1 rho2 ]
abs(spec(A+B*Fy))
F=[Fy Fz ]
N
APPENDIX B: Wonham theorem and pole placement
Let A and B be real matrices of dimension n  n and n  m respectively. Let  =
f1; :::; ng be an arbitrary set of n complex numbers i such that any i with Im(i) 6= 0
appears in  in a conjugate pair.
28
Wonham (1967) pole placement theorem. The pair (A;B) is controllable
( rank (B;AB;A2B;:::;An 1B) = n) if and only if, for every choice of the set  =
f1; :::; ng, there is a matrix F such that A+BF has  for its sets of eigenvalues.
Wonhams (1967) pole placement theorem states that linear feedback rule parameters
are always bifurcation parameters of controllable linear systems. Close to bifurcations
limit values, a small change of the policy rule parameters leads to big qualitative change
of the dynamics of the system to be controlled, as eigenvalues shift from being outside
the unit circle to inside the unit circle.
Pole placement using the canonical form.
The characteristic polynomial for the open-loop eigenvalues and the desired closed-
loop eigenvalues corresponds to distinct coe¢cients (the trace and determinant):
2   T (A)+D (A) = 0 and 2   T (A+BF)+D (A+BF) = 0:
The canonical form of the dynamic system is such that:
bA =  T (A)  D (A)
1 0

, bB =  1
0

:
Hence, the closed-loop canonical model has the property that the feedback rule para-
meters appear only on the rst line. It should correspond to given closed-loop trace and
determinant.
bA+ bB bF =  T (A) + bFx  D (A) + bF
1 0

=

T (A+BF)  D (A+BF)
1 0

:
Then:
bF =  bFx bF  =   T (A+BF)  T (A)   (D (A+BF) D (A))  :
The feedback rule is equal to bF times a similarity matrix which is the product of the
canonical controllability matrix of bA+bBbF and the inverse of the controllability matrix of
A+BF:
F =     T (A)  T D  D (A)   1 T (A)
0 1
 
 

T (A)  1


0  

! 1
F =     T (A)  T (A+BF) D (A+BF) D (A)  1   1
0   

!
F=

1

(T (A+BF)  T (A))   1

(T (A+BF)  T (A)) + 

(D (A+BF) D (A))

:
Pole placement using Ackermanns (1972) formula for a controllable system
(we use the notationA+BF instead of A BF, hence the minus sign at the beginning):
F =     0 1    B AB  1  A2   T (A+BF)A+D (A+BF) :
Applied on the New-Keynesian model:
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F=     0 1     + 1
0  


! 1 
1 + 

  

 

1

2
  T

1 + 

  

 

1


+D

1 0
0 1
!
F=

1

(T (A+BF)  T (A))   1

(T (A+BF)  T (A)) + 

(D (A+BF) D (A))

:
The transfer function of the New-Keynesian model is:
C (sI   A) 1B =     1 1  1 +    s    

1

  s
 1

0

=
s  +

s2   TAs+DA :
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Figure 1: Stability triangle in the plane of policy parameters, 
γ=0.5, κ=0.1, β=0.99 
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Figure 2: Stability triangle in the plane of policy parameters, 
γ=-0.5, κ=-0.1, β=0.99 
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line AC - Saddle
node p(1)
line BC Flip p(-1)
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Figure 3: LQR and stability triangle in the plane of policy 
parameters, γ=0.5, κ=0.1, β=0.99 
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Figure 4: LQR and stability triangle in the plane of policy 
parameters, γ=-0.5, κ=-0.1, β=0.99 
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Figure 5: New-Keynesian vs. Ramsey optimal policy,  
γ=0.5, κ=0.1, β=0.99.   
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